Non-malleable codesintroduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs at ICS 2010are key-less coding schemes in which mauling attempts to an encoding of a given message, w.r.t. some class of tampering adversaries, result in a decoded value that is either identical or unrelated to the original message. Such codes are very useful for protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against tampering attacks against the memory. Clearly, non-malleability is hopeless if the class of tampering adversaries includes the decoding and encoding algorithm. To circumvent this obstacle, the majority of past research focused on designing non-malleable codes for various tampering classes, albeit assuming that the adversary is unable to decode. Nonetheless, in many concrete settings, this assumption is not realistic.
Introduction
Non-malleable codes (NMC) [21] were originally proposed by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [21] in 2010 and have since been studied intensively by the research community (see, e.g., [35, 25, 13, 26, 33, 1, 10] for some examples). Nonmalleable codes are an extension of the concept of error correction and detection and can guarantee the integrity of a message in the presence of tampering attacks when error correction/detection may not be possible. Informally, a non-malleable code (Encode, Decode) guarantees that a codeword modied via an algorithm A, from some class A of allowed tampering attacks, 4 either encodes the original message, or a completely unrelated value. Notice that non-malleable codes do not need to correct or detect errors. This relaxation enables us to design codes that resist much broader tampering classes A than what is possible to achieve for error correcting/detecting codes. As an illustrative example, it is trivial to construct non-malleable codes for the class of constant tampering functions; that is, e.g., functions that replace the codeword by a dierent but valid codeword.
Clearly, the output of a constant tampering function is independent of the original encoded message, and hence satises the non-malleability property. On the other hand, it is impossible to achieve error correction/detection against such tampering classes, as by denition valid codewords do not contain errors.
Applications of non-malleable codes. The fact that non-malleable codes can be built for broader tampering classes makes them particularly attractive as a mechanism for protecting the memory of physical devices from tampering attacks [8, 3] .
To protect a cryptographic functionality F against tampering with respect to a class of attacks A applied to a secret key κ that is stored in memory, we can proceed as follows. Instead of storing κ directly in memory, we use a non-malleable code for A, and store the codeword c ← Encode(κ). Thus, each time when F wants to access κ, we rst decodeκ = Decode(c), and, only if Decode(c) = ⊥, 4 Sometimes, the tampering algorithms are also called tampering functions.
we run F(κ, ·) on any input of our choice. Intuitively, as long as the adversary can only apply tampering attacks from the class A, non-malleability of (Encode, Decode) guarantees that any tampering results into a key that is unrelated to the original key, and hence the output of F does not reveal information about the original secret key. For further discussion on the application of nonmalleable codes to tamper resilience we refer the reader to [21] .
The tampering class A. It is impossible to have codes that are non-malleable for all possible (ecient) tampering algorithms A. For instance, if A contains the composition of Encode and Decode, then given a codeword c the adversary can apply a tampering algorithm A that rst decodes c to get the encoded value x; then, e.g., it ips the rst bit of x to obtainx, and re-encodesx. Clearly, such an attack results intox that is related to the original value x, and non-malleability is violated. A major research direction is hence to design non-malleable codes for broad classes of tampering attacks that exclude the above obvious attacks.
Prominent examples are bit-wise tampering [21] , where the adversary can modify each bit of the codeword individually, split-state tampering [2] , where the codeword consists of two (possibly large) parts that can be tampered with individually, and tampering functions with bounded complexity [27] .
All the above mentioned classes of attacks have in common that the Decode algorithm is not part of A. Indeed, if we want to achieve non-malleability, then we must have that Decode / ∈ A, as otherwise the following attack becomes possible. Let A be the tampering algorithm that rst decodes the codeword c to get the encoded value x, and then, depending on the rst bit b of x, it overwrites c with c b , where Decode(c 0 ) = Decode(c 1 ). In this work, we aim at codes that achieve a weaker security guarantee than standard non-malleability, but for the rst time can protect the security of cryptographic functionalities F with respect to a class of tampering attacks A with Decode ∈ A.
On the importance of Decode ∈ A. Besides being an obvious extension of the class of tampering attacks for which we can design non-malleable codes (albeit achieving a weaker security guarantee, which we will outline in Section 1.1), allowing that Decode ∈ A has some important advantages for cryptographic applications, as emphasized by the following example. Consider a physical device storing an encoded key Encode(κ) in memory, and implementing a cryptographic functionality F. If the device attempts to implement the cryptographic functionality F, then whenever it is executed, it has to run the Decode function to recover the original secret key κ before running F(κ, ·). Suppose that a malicious piece of software A, e.g., a virus, infects the device and attempts to learn information about the secret key κ. Clearly, once A infects the device, it may use the resources available on the device itself, which in particular have to be sucient to run the Decode algorithm. Hence, if we view the virus A as the tampering algorithm, to maintain the functionality of the device (which in particular requires to run Decode) and at the same time to allow the virus A to control the resources of attacked device, it is necessary that Decode ∈ A. 5 Our main contribution is to design non-malleable codes that can guarantee meaningful security in the above described setting. We provide more details on our results in the next section.
Our Contribution
Leaky non-malleable codes. The standard non-malleability property guarantees that decoding the tampered codeword reveals nothing about the original encoded message x. Formally, this is modelled by a simulation-based argument, where we consider the following tampering experiment. First, the message x gets encoded to c ← Encode(x) and the adversary can apply a tampering algorithm A ∈ A resulting in a modied codewordc; the output of the tampering experiment is then dened as Decode(c). Roughly speaking, non-malleability is guaranteed if we can construct an (ecient) simulator S that can produce a distribution that is (computationally) indistinguishable from the output of the tampering experiment, without having access to x; the simulator is typically allowed to return a special symbol same to signal that (it believes) the adversarial tampering did not modify the encoded message.
As explained above, if Decode ∈ A, then the above notion is trivially impossible to achieve, since the adversary can easily learn O(log k) bits, where k is the size of the message. 6 In this work, we introduce a new notion that we call leaky non-malleability, which models the fact that, when A ∈ A, the adversary is allowed to learn some (bounded) amount of information about the message
x. Formally, we give the simulator S additional access to a leakage oracle; more concretely, this means that in order to simulate the output of the tampering experiment, S can specify a leakage function L : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} and receive L(x). 7 Clearly, if = k, then the simulation is trivial, and hence our aim is to design codes where is as close as possible to the necessary bound of O(log k).
Notice that, due to the allowed leakage, our notion of leaky non-malleability makes most sense when the message x is sampled from a distribution of high min-entropy. But, indeed, this is the case in the main application of NMC, where the goal is to protect a secret key of a cryptographic scheme; and in fact, as we show at the end of the paper, leaky non-malleability still allows to guarantee protection against memory tampering in many interesting cases. Modelling space-bounded tampering adversaries. In the above application with the virus, we allow the virus to use all resources of the device when it tampers with the codeword. Of course, this means that the virus is limited in the amount of space it can use. We exploit this observation by putting forward the notion of non-malleable codes that resist adversaries operating in bounded space. That is, in contrast to earlier works on NMC, we do not require any independence of the tampering (like, e.g., in the split-state model), nor the fact that tampering comes from a restricted complexity class. Instead, we allow arbitrary ecient tampering attacks that can globally modify the codeword, as long as the attacks operate in the space available on the device. Since the lower bounds in space complexity are notoriously hard, we follow earlier works [20, 19, 4, 18 ] that argue about space-bounded adversaries (albeit in a dierent setting), using the random oracle methodology and its connection to graph pebbling games.
Let us provide some more details on our model. Our setting follows the earlier work of Dziembowski, Kazana and Wichs [20, 19] and considers a big adversary B that has unlimited space (though runs in PPT) and creates small adversaries A (e.g., viruses) that it sends to the device. On the device, A can use the available space to modify the codeword in some arbitrary way. We emphasize that A has no granular restrictions, and hence can read the entire codeword. Moreover, it can follow an arbitrary ecient (PPT) tampering strategy. The only restriction is that A has to operate in bounded space. Both adversaries A and B have access to a random oracle H. After A has nished its tampering attack, we proceed as in the normal NMC experiment, i.e., we decode the modied codeword and output the result. We further strengthen our denition by allowing the adversary to repeat the above attack multiple times, which is sometimes referred to as continuous tampering [25, 33] . We note that, as in [33] , we require an a-priori xed upper bound on the number of viruses A that B can adaptively choose.
Technical overview of our construction. Our construction is based on Proofs of Space (a.k.a. PoS), introduced in [4, 18] . First, let us recall the notion of PoS briey. In a PoS protocol, a prover P proves that it has sucient space available to a space-bounded verier V. Using the Fiat-Shamir [29] transformation, the entire proof can be presented by π id for some identity id . The verier can verify the pair (id , π id ) within bounded space (say s). The soundness guarantee is that a cheating prover, with overwhelming probability, can not produce a correct proof unless it uses a large amount of space. Our NMC construction encodes a value x ∈ {0, 1} k by setting id := x and then computing the proof π id . Hence, the codeword is c = (x, π x ). Decoding is done just by running the verication procedure of the PoS. Now, if the codeword is stored in an s-bounded device, then decoding is possible within the available space whereas encoding is not in particular, even if the adversary can obtain x, it can not re-encode to a related value, say (x + 1, π x+1 ), as guaranteed by the soundness of the underlying PoS. 8 We stress that our 8 Notice that since the space-bounded attacker A is able to decode anyway, we do not aim to hide x in c. soundness requirement is slightly dierent than the existing PoS constructions, as we require some form of extractability from the PoS: Given an honestly generated pair (x, π x ), if the space-bounded virus can compute a valid pair (x , π x ) where x = x, then one can eciently extract x from the set of random oracle queries that the big adversary made before installing the virus. Our put dierently, the only way to compute a valid proof is to overwrite (x, π x ) with a valid pair (x , π x ) pre-computed by the big adversary.
To formally prove the leaky non-malleability of our construction, we need to
show that the output of the tampering experiment can be simulated given only limited leakage on x. For simplicity, let us explain how this can be done for one tampering query. Intuitively this is possible because the big adversary can hard-code at most polynomially many (say q) correct pairs {x i , π xi } i∈[q] into the virus. Now, since any such x i = x can be eciently extracted from the random oracle queries made by B prior to choosing the virus, log(q) bits of leakage are sucient to compute the exact x i from the list {x i } i∈[q] . 9 For multiple adaptive tampering queries things get more complicated. Nonetheless, we are able to show that each such query can be simulated by logarithmic leakage.
We emphasize that our encoding scheme is deterministic for a xed choice of the random oracle. In particular, the only randomness comes from the random oracle itself. Also, in the security proof, we do not require to program the random oracle in the on-line phase of the security reduction, in that the random oracle can just be xed at the beginning of the security game. 10 . We concretely instantiate our construction by adapting the PoS protocol from Ren and Devadas [40] , that uses so-called stacks of localized expander graphs.
Applications: Trading leakage for tamper resilience. One may ask if our notion of leaky non-malleability is useful for the original application of tamper protection. In Section 7 we show that cryptographic primitives which remain secure if the adversary obtains some bounded amount of leakage from the key, can naturally be protected against tampering attacks using our new notion of leaky non-malleability. Since there is a large body of work on bounded leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, including signature schemes, symmetric and public key encryption [32, 16, 34, 38, 39, 22, 23] , and many more, our transformation protects these primitives against any ecient space-bounded tampering attack.
Additional Related Work
Only very few works consider non-malleable codes for global tampering functions [5] . Very related to our attack model are in particular the works of Dziem-9 In slightly more detail, the set {xi} i∈[q] can be extracted by the simulator outside the leakage oracle as it does not depend on x, so the simulator can just ask for the index of the exact xi to later reconstruct xi in full.
10 Since adaptive (i.e. on-line) programming is not required, for all practical purposes our construction can be instantiated by standard hash functions like SHA-1. However, our proof crucially relies on the ability of the simulator to control the random oracle (albeit non adaptively), in order to make the extraction work.
bowski, Kazana and Wichs [20, 19] . In these works, the authors also consider a setting where a so-called big-adversary infects a machine with a space-bounded small adversary. Using techniques from graph pebbling, the authors show how to construct one-time computable functions [20] and leakage resilient key evolution schemes [19] when the small adversary has to operate in bounded space.
The avor of non-malleable codes in which there is an a-priory upper bound on the total number of tampering queries, without self-destruct, was originally considered in [9] . This concept has a natural application to the setting of bounded tamper resilience (see, e.g., [15, 14, 24] ).
For other related works on non-malleable codes and its applications we refer to [37] .
Preliminaries

Notation
For a string x, we denote its length by |x|; if X is a set, |X | represents the number of elements in X . When x is chosen randomly in X , we write x ← X . When A is an algorithm, we write y ← A(x) to denote a run of A on input x and output y; if A is probabilistic, then y is a random variable and A(x; r) denotes a run of A on input x and randomness r. An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is probabilistic and for any input x, r ∈ {0, 1} * the computation of A(x; r) terminates in at most a polynomial (in the input size) number of steps. We often consider algorithms A O(·) , with access to an oracle O(·). We denote with λ ∈ N the security parameter. A function ν : N → [0, 1] is negligible in the security parameter (or simply negligible), denoted ν(λ) ∈ negl(λ), if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in λ, i.e. ν(λ) = λ −ω(1) . A function µ : N → R is a polynomial in the security parameter, written µ(λ) ∈ poly(λ), if, for an arbitrary constant c > 0, we have µ(λ) ∈ O(λ c ).
Coding Schemes
We recall the standard notion of a coding scheme for binary messages. Denition 1 (Coding scheme). A (k, n)-code Π = (Init, Encode, Decode) is a triple of algorithms specied as follows: (i) The (randomized) generation algorithm Init takes as input λ ∈ N and returns public parameters ω ∈ {0, 1} * ; (ii) The (randomized) encoding algorithm Encode takes as input hard-wired public parameters ω ∈ {0, 1} * and a value x ∈ {0, 1} k , and returns a codeword c ∈ {0, 1} n ; (iii) The (deterministic) decoding algorithm Decode takes as input hard-wired public parameters ω ∈ {0, 1} * and a codeword c ∈ {0, 1} n , and outputs a value in {0, 1} k ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ denotes an invalid codeword.
We say that Π satises correctness if for all ω ∈ {0, 1} * output by Init(1 λ ) and for all x ∈ {0, 1} k , Decode ω (Encode ω (x)) = x with overwhelming probability over the randomness of the encoding algorithm.
In this paper we will be interested in modelling coding schemes where there is an explicit bound on the space complexity required to decode a given codeword. Denition 2 (Time/space-bounded algorithm). Let A be an algorithm. For any s, t ∈ N we say that A is s-space bounded and t-time bounded (or simply (s, t)-bounded) if at any time during its execution the entire state of A can be described by at most s bits and A runs for at most t time-steps.
For such algorithms we have s A ≤ s and t A ≤ t (with the obvious meaning). We often omit the time parameter and simply say that A is s-bounded, which means that A is an s-bounded polynomial-time algorithm. Given an input x ∈ {0, 1} n , and an initial conguration σ ∈ {0, 1} s−n , we write (y,σ) := A(x; σ) for the output y of A including its nal congurationσ ∈ {0, 1} s−n . The class of all s-space bounded deterministic polynomial-time algorithms is denoted by A s space .
We stress that, similarly to previous works [20, 19] , in case A is modelled as a Turing machine, we count the length of the input tape and the position of all the tape heads within the space bound s. However we emphasize that, although A is space-bounded, we allow to hard-wire auxiliary information of arbitrary polynomial length in its description that is not accounted for in the space-bound. Intuitively, a coding scheme can be decoded in bounded space if the decoding algorithm is space bounded.
Notice that we do not count the length of the public parameters in the space bound; this is because the value ω is hard-coded into the description of the encoding and decoding algorithms.
3 Non-Malleability in Bounded Space
Space-Bounded Tampering
The standard way of formalizing the non-malleability property is to require that, for any allowed adversary 11 A, tampering with an honestly computed target encoding of some value x ∈ {0, 1} k , there exists an ecient simulator S that is able to emulate the outcome of the decoding algorithm on the tampered codeword, without knowing x. The simulator is allowed to return a special symbol same , signalling that (it believes) the adversary did not modify the value x contained in the original encoding.
Below, we formalize non-malleability in the case where the set of allowed adversaries consists of all ecient s-bounded algorithms, for some parameter s ∈ N (cf. Denition 2). However, since we are particularly interested in decoding 11 The adversary is often referred to as the tampering function; however, for our purposes, it is more convenient to think of the tampering function as an algorithm.
algorithms that are d-bounded for some value d ≤ s, the standard notion of non-malleability is impossible to achieve, as in such a case the algorithm A can simply decode the tampered codeword and leak some information on the encoded message via tampering (see also the discussion in Section 3.2). To overcome this obstacle, we will give the simulator S some extra-power, in that S will additionally be allowed to obtain some limited amount of information on x in order to simulate the view of A. To capture this, we introduce an oracle O ,x leak that can be queried in order to retrieve up-to bits of information about x.
Denition 4 (Leakage oracle). A leakage oracle O ,x
leak is a stateful oracle that maintains a counter ctr that is initially set to 0. The oracle is parametrized by a string x ∈ {0, 1} k and a value ∈ N. When O ,x leak is invoked on a polynomialtime computable leakage function L, the value L(x) is computed, its length is added to ctr, and if ctr ≤ , then L(x) is returned; otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
Since our main construction is in the random oracle model (a.k.a. ROM), we will dene space-bounded non-malleability explicitly for this setting. Recall that in the ROM a hash function H(·) is modelled as an external oracle implementing a random function, which can be queried by all algorithms (including the adversary); in the simulation, the simulator S simulates the random oracle. We introduce the notion of a tampering oracle, which essentially corresponds to repeated (adaptive) tampering with a target n-bit codeword, using at most s bits of total space. Below, we consider that the total space of length s is split into two parts: (i) Persistent space of length p, that also stores the codeword of length n, and that is never erased by the oracle; and (ii) Transient (or non-persistent) space, of length s−p, that is erased by the oracle after every tampering. Looking ahead, in our tampering application (cf. Section 7), the persistent space corre- 
Notice that in the denition above we put space restrictions only on the tampering algorithm A. The oracle itself is space unbounded. In particular, this means that even if the decoding algorithm requires more space than s, the oracle is well dened. Moreover, this allows us to assume that the auxiliary persistent spaceσ 0 is never erased/overwritten by the oracle.
Furthermore, each algorithm A takes as input a codewordc which is the result of the previous tampering attempt. In the literature, this setting is sometimes called persistent continuous tampering [33] . However, a closer look into our setting reveals that the model is actually quite dierent. Note that, the auxiliary persistent space σ 0 (that is the persistent space left after storing the codeword) can be used to copy parts of the original encoding, that thus can be mauled multiple times. (In fact, as we show in Section 3.2, if p = 2n, the above oracle actually allows for non-persistent tampering as considered in [33, 25] .)
In the denition of non-malleability we will require that the output of the above tampering oracle can be simulated given only bits of leakage on the input
x. We formalize this through a simulation oracle, which we dene below. 
We are now ready to dene our main notion. Denition 7 (Space-bounded continuous non-malleability). Let H be a hash function modelled as a random oracle, and let Π = (Init H , Encode H , Decode H ) be a (k, n)-code. For parameters , s, p, θ, d ∈ N, with s ≥ p ≥ n, we say that Π is an -leaky (s, p)-space-bounded θ-continuously non-malleable code with d-bounded decoding (( , s, p, θ, d)-SP-NMC for short) in the ROM, if it satises the following conditions. Space-bounded decoding: The decoding algorithm Decode H is d-bounded. Non-malleability: For all PPT distinguishers D, there exists a PPT sim-
where D asks at most θ queries to O cnm . The probability is taken over the choice of the random oracle H, the sampling of the initial state for the oracle O cnm , and the random coin tosses of D and S = (S 1 , S 2 ).
Intuitively, in the above denition algorithm S 1 takes care of simulating random oracle queries, whereas S 2 takes care of simulating the answer to tampering queries. Typically, S 1 and S 2 are allowed to share a state, but we do not explicitly write this for simplifying notation. For readers familiar with the notion of non-malleable codes in the common reference string model (see, e.g., [35, 25] ), we note that the simulator is not required to program the public parameters (but is instead allowed to program the random oracle). 12 Remark 1. Note that we consider the space-bounded adversary A as deterministic; this is without loss of generality, as the distinguisher D can always hard-wire the best randomness directly into A. Also, A does not explicitly take the public parameters ω as input; this is also without loss of generality, as D can always hard-wire ω in the description of A.
Achievable Parameters
We now make a few remarks on our denition of space-bounded non-malleability, and further investigate for which range of the parameters s (total space available for tampering), p (persistent space available for tampering), θ (number of adaptive tampering queries), d (space required for decoding), and (leakage bound), our notion is achievable. Let Π = (Init H , Encode H , Decode H ) be a (k, n)-code in the ROM. 13 First, note that leaky space-bounded non-malleability is trivial to achieve whenever = k (or = k − ε, for ε ∈ O(log λ)); this is because, for such values of the leakage bound, the simulator can simply obtain the input message
x ∈ {0, 1} k , in which case the security guarantee becomes useless. Second, the larger the values of s and θ, the larger is the class of tampering attacks and the number of tampering attempts that the underlying code can tolerate. So, the challenge is to construct coding schemes tolerating a large space bound in the presence of many tampering attempts, using small leakage.
12 However, we stress that in the proof of our code construction (cf. Section 6), we do not need adaptive random oracle programming. 13 The discussion below applies also to codes not relying on random oracles. An important feature that will be useful for characterizing the range of achievable parameters in our denition is the so-called self-destruct capability, which determines the behavior of the decoding algorithm after an invalid codeword is ever processed. In particular, a code with the self-destruct capability is such that the decoding algorithm always outputs ⊥ after the rst ⊥ is ever returned (i.e., after the rst invalid codeword is ever decoded). Such a feature, which was already essential in previous works studying continuously non-malleable codes [25, 12, 11] , can be engineered by enabling the decoding function to overwrite the entire memory content with a xed string, say the all-zero string if a codeword is decoded to ⊥.
Depending on the self-destruct capability being available or not, we have the following natural observations:
If Π is not allowed to self-destruct, it is impossible to achieve space-bounded non-malleability, for non-trivial values of , whenever θ ≥ n (for any s ≥ p ≥ n, and any d ∈ N). This can be seen by considering the deterministic algorithm A i auxi (for some i ∈ [n]) that overwrites the rst i − 1 bits of the input codeword with the values aux i := (c [1] , . . . , c[i − 1]), and additionally sets the i-th bit to 0 (leaving the other bits unchanged). Using such an algorithm, a PPT distinguisher D can guess the bit c[i] of the target codeword to be either 0 (in case the tampering oracle returned the input message x) or 1 (in case the tampering oracle returned a value dierent from x, namely ⊥). Hence, D returns 1 if and only if Decode H ω (c) = x.
The same attack was already formally analyzed in [12] (generalizing a previous attack by Gennaro et al. [31] ); it suces to note here that the above attack can be mounted using s = n bits of space (which are needed for processing the input encoding), and requires θ = n tampering attempts.
Even if Π is allowed to self-destruct, whenever s ≥ d and p ≥ n + θ − 1, leaky space-bounded non-malleability requires ≥ θ. This can be seen by considering the following attack. An s-bounded algorithm A 1 c0,c1 , with hardwired two valid encodings c 0 , c 1 ∈ {0, 1} n of two distinct messages x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} k does the following: (i) Decodes c obtaining x (which requires d ≤ s bits of space); (ii) Stores the rst θ − 1 bits of x in the persistent storagẽ σ 0 ; (iii) If the θ-th bit of x is one, it replaces c withc = c 1 , else it replaces c withc = c 0 . During the next tampering query, D can specify an algorithm A 2 c0,c1 that overwrites the target encoding with either c 0 or c 1 depending on the rst 14 bit ofσ 0 being zero or one, and so on until the rst θ − 1 bits of x are leaked. So in total, it is able to leak at least θ bits of x (including the θ-th bit of x leaked by A 1 ).
The previous attack clearly implies that it is impossible to achieve leaky space-bounded non-malleability, for non-trivial values of , whenever s ≥ d, θ = k, and p ≥ n + k − ε, for ε ∈ O(log λ). A simple variant of the above attack, where essentially D aims at leaking the target encoding c instead of 14 Recall that the tampering oracle of Denition 5 initializes the persistent space σ0 used by the current tampering algorithm, with the corresponding nal stateσ0 returned by the previous tampering algorithm.
the input x, yields a similar impossibility result whenever s ≥ p, d ∈ N, θ = n, and p ≥ 2n − ε, for ε ∈ O(log λ).
The above discussion is summarized in the following theorem (see also Fig. 1 for a pictorial representation). Theorem 1. Let , s, p, θ, d, k, n ∈ N be functions of the security parameter λ ∈ N. The following holds: (i) No (k, n)-code Π without the self-destruct capability can be an ( , s, p, θ, d)-SP-NMC for d ∈ N, s ≥ p ≥ n and = n − µ, where µ ∈ ω(log λ). (ii) For any 1 ≤ θ < k, if Π is a (k, n)-code (with or without the self-destruct capability) that is an ( , s, p, θ, d)-SP-NMC for d ∈ N, s ≥ d and p ≥ n+θ−1, then ≥ θ. (iii) No (k, n)-code Π (even with the self-destruct capability) can be an ( , s, p, θ,
Remark 2. We emphasize that our coding scheme (cf. Section 6) does not rely on any self-destruct mechanism, and achieves θ ≈ k/ log λ for non-trivial values of the leakage parameter. This leaves open the question to construct a code relying on the self-destruct capability, that achieves security for any θ ∈ poly(λ) and for non-trivial leakage, with parameters s, p, d consistent with the above theorem.
We leave this as an interesting direction for future research.
4
Building Blocks
Random Oracles
All our results are in the random oracle model (ROM). Therefore we rst discuss some basic conventions and denitions related to random oracles. First, recall that in the ROM, at setup, a hash function H is sampled uniformly at random, and all algorithms, including the adversary, are given oracle access to H (unless stated otherwise). For instance, we let Π = (Init H , Encode H , Decode H ) be a coding scheme in the ROM. Second, without loss of generality, we will always consider a random oracle H with a type H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n H .
We emphasize that unlike many other proofs in the ROM, we will not need the full programmability of random oracles. In fact, looking ahead, in the security proof of our code construction from Section 6, we can just assume that the random oracle is non-adaptively programmable as dened in [6] . 15 The basic idea is that the simulator/reduction samples a partially dened random-looking function at the beginning of the security game, and uses that function as the random 15 In [6] , the authors show that such random oracles are equivalent to non-programmable ones, as dened in [30] .
oracle H. In particular, by xing a function ahead of time, the reduction xes all future responses to random oracle callsthis is in contrast to programmable random oracles, which allow the simulator to choose random values adaptively in the game, and also to program the output of the oracle in a convenient manner.
For any string x, and any random oracle H, we use the notation H x to denote the specialized random oracle that accepts only inputs with prex equal to x.
We additionally make the following conventions: Query Tables. Random 
is an injective function that maps each input u to a unique identier, represented in bits. Clearly, for any tuple (i, u, H(u)) we have that I −1 (i) = u.
Input Field. Let Q H = ((i 1 , u 1 , v 1 ), · · · , (i q , u q , v q )) be a query table. The input eld IP Q H of Q H is dened as the tuple IP Q H = (u 1 , . . . , u q ).
Merkle Commitments
A Merkle commitment is a special type of commitment scheme 16 exploiting so-called hash trees [36] . We require the following properties to hold.
Correctness: For all z = (z 1 , . . . , z N ) ∈ {0, 1} kN , and all i ∈ [N ], we have that is dened as follows: 
The standard hash-tree construction due to Merkle [36] gives us a (k, k, N, O(k log(N )), negl(k))-Merkle Commitment.
Graph Pebbling and Labeling
Throughout this paper G = (V, E) is considered to be a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges of the graph G. Without loss of generality we assume that the vertices of G are ordered lexicographically and are represented by integers in [N ] , where N = |V |. Vertices with no incoming edges are called input vertices or sources, and vertices with no outgoing edges are called output vertices or sinks. We denote Γ − (v), the set of
In this section we briey explain the concept of graph labeling and its connection to the abstract game called graph pebbling which has been introduced in [17] . For more details we refer to previous literature in, e.g., [17, 40, 4, 18] . We follow conventions from [40] and will use results from the same. Sometimes for completeness we will use texts verbatim from the same paper.
Labeling of a graph. Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n H be a random oracle. The Hlabeling of a graph G is a function which assigns a label to each vertex in the graph; more precisely, it is a function label : V → {0, 1} n H which maps each vertex v ∈ V to a bit string label(v) := H(q v ), where we denote by v (1) , . . . , v (d) = Γ − (v) and let
An algorithm A H labels a subset of vertices W ⊆ V if it computes label(W ). Specically, A H labels the graph G if it computes label(V ). Additionally, for m ≤ |V |, we dene the H-labeling of the graph G with m faults 17 as a function label : V → {0, 1} n H such that, for some subset of 17 One can also dene an analogy of faults in the pebbling game by adding a second kind of pebbles. These pebbles are called red pebbles in [18] and wild cards in [4] . vertices M ⊂ V of size m, it holds label(v) = H(q v ) for every v ∈ V \ M , and label(v) = H(q v ) for every v ∈ M . Sometimes we refer to labeling with faults as partial labeling. The following lemma appeared in form of a discussion in [40] .
It is based on an observation previously made in [18] . Lemma 1 ([40, Section 5.2]). Let A H be an (s, t)-bounded algorithm which computes the labeling of a DAG G with m ∈ N faults. Then there exists an (s + m · n H , t)-bounded algorithmÃ H that computes the labeling of G without faults but gets m correct labels to start with (they are initially stored in the memory ofÃ H and sometimes called initial labels).
Intuitively the above lemma follows because the algorithmÃ
H can overwrite the additional space it has, once the initial labels stored there are not needed.
Pebbling game. The pebbling of a DAG G = (V, E) is dened as a singleplayer game. The game is described by a sequence of pebbling congurations P = (P 0 , . . . , P T ), where P i ⊆ V is the set of pebbled vertices after the i-th move. In our model, the initial conguration P 0 does not need to be empty.
The rules of the pebbling game are the following. During one move (translation from P i to P i+1 ), the player can place one pebble on a vertex v if v is an input vertex or if all predecessors of v already have a pebble. After placing one pebble, the player can remove pebbles from arbitrary many vertices. 18 We say that the
The time complexity of the pebbling game P is dened as the number of moves t(P) := T . The space complexity of P is dened as the maximal number of pebbles needed at any pebbling step; formally, s(P) := max i∈[0,T ] {|P i |}.
Ex-post-facto pebbling. Let A H be an algorithm that computes the (partial) Hlabeling of a DAG G. The ex-post-facto pebbling bases on the transcript of the graph labeling. It processes all oracle queries made by A H during the graph labeling (one at a time and in the order they were made). Informally, every oracle query of the form q v , for some v ∈ V , results in placing a pebble on the vertex v in the ex-post-facto pebbling game. This provides us a link between labeling and pebbling of the graph G. The formal denition follows.
Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n H be a random oracle and Q H a table of all random oracle calls made by A H during the graph labeling. Then we dene the ex-postfacto pebbling P of the graph G as follows:
The initial conguration P 0 contains every vertex v ∈ V such that label(v) has been used for some oracle query (e.g. some query of the form H(· · · label(v) · · · )) at some point in the transcript but the query q v is not listed in the part of the transcript preceding such query.
Assume that the current conguration is P i , for some i ≥ 0. Then nd the next unprocessed oracle query which is of the form q v , for some vertex v, and dene P i+1 as follows:
18 Similar to [40] in our model we assume that removing pebbles is for free as it does not involve any oracle query 1. Place a pebble on the vertex v.
2. Remove all unnecessary pebbles. A pebble on a vertex v is called unnecessary if label(v) is not used for any future oracle query, or if the query q v is listed in the succeeding part of the transcript before label(v) is used in an argument of some other query later. Intuitively, either label(v) is never used again, or A H anyway queries q v before it is used again.
The lemma below appeared in several variations in the literature (see, for example, [17, 4, 40] ), depending on the denition of graph pebbling.
Lemma 2 (Labeling Lemma). Let G be a DAG. Consider an (s, t)-bounded adversary A H which computes the H-labeling of the graph G. Also assume that A H does not guess any correct output of H without querying it. Then the ex-post facto pebbling strategy P described above pebbles the graph G, and the complexity of P is s(P) ≤ s n H and t(P) ≤ t. Proof. By denition of ex-post-facto pebbling, it is straightforward to observe that if A H computes the H-labeling of the graph G, then the ex-post-facto pebbling P pebbles the graph. Since we assume that the adversary does not guess the correct label, the only way A H can learn the label of the vertex v is by querying the random oracle. The bound on t(P) is immediate. Again, by denition of the ex-post-facto pebbling, there is no unnecessary pebble at any time. Thus, the number of required pebbles is equal to the maximum number of labels that A H needs to store at once. Hence, the space bound follows directly from the fact that each label consists of n H bits and that the algorithm A H is s-space bounded.
Localized expander graphs. A (µ, α, β)-bipartite expander, for 0 < α < β < 1, is a DAG with µ sources and µ sinks such that any αµ sinks are connected to at least βµ sources. We can dene a DAG G µ,k G ,α,β by stacking k G (∈ N) bipartite expanders. Informally, stacking means that sinks of the i-th bipartite expander are sources of the i+1-st bipartite expander. It is easy to see that such a graph has µ(k G + 1) nodes which are partitioned into k G + 1 sets (which we call layers) of size µ. A Stack of Localized Expander Graphs (SoLEG) is a DAG G µ,k G ,α,β obtained by applying the transformation called localization (see [7, 40] for a denition) on each layer of the graph G µ,k G ,α,β .
We restate two lemmas about pebbling complexity of SoLEG from [40] . The latter appeared in [40] in form of a discussion. Lemma 3 ([40, Theorem 4] ). Let G µ,k G ,α,β be a SoLEG where γ := β − 2α > 0. Let P = (P 0 , . . . , P t(P) ) be a pebbling strategy that pebbles at least αµ output vertices of the graph G µ,k G ,α,β which were not initially pebbled, where the initial pebbling conguration is such that |P 0 | ≤ γµ, and the space complexity of P is bounded by s(P) ≤ γµ. Then the time complexity of P has the following lower bound: t(P) ≥ 2 k G αµ.
Lemma 4 ([40, Section 5.2]). Let G µ,k G ,α,β be a SoLEG and H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n H be a random oracle. There exists a polynomial time algorithm A H that computes the H-labeling of the graph G µ,k G ,α,β in µn H -space. 5 Non-Interactive Proofs of Space
NIPoS Denition
A proof of space (PoS) [4, 18] is a (possibly interactive) protocol between a prover and a verier, in which the prover attempts to convince the verier that it used a considerable amount of memory or disk space in a way that can be easily checked by the verier. Here, easily means with a small amount of space and computation; a PoS with these characteristics is sometimes called a proof of transient space [40] . A non-interactive PoS (NIPoS) is simply a PoS where the proof consists of a single message, sent by the prover to the verier; to each proof, it is possible to associate an identity.
Intuitively, a NIPoS should meet two properties known as completeness and soundness. Completeness says that a prover using a sucient amount of space will always be accepted by the verier. Soundness, on the other hand, ensures that if the prover invests too little space, it has a hard time to convince the verier. A formal denition follows below. Denition 9 (Non-interactive proof of space). For parameters s P , s V , s, t, k, n ∈ N, with s V ≤ s < s P , and ν pos ∈ (0, 1), an (s P , s V , s, t, k, n, ν pos )-noninteractive proof of space scheme (NIPoS for short) in the ROM consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup H , P H , V H ) with the following syntax.
Setup H (1 λ ): This is a randomized polynomial-time (in λ) algorithm with no space restriction. It takes as input the security parameter and it outputs public parameters ω pos ∈ {0, 1} * . P H ωpos (id ): This is a probabilistic polynomial-time (in λ) algorithm that is s Pbounded. It takes as input an identity id ∈ {0, 1} k and hard-wired public parameters ω pos , and it returns a proof of space π ∈ {0, 1} n . V H ωpos (id , π): This algorithm is s V -bounded and deterministic. It takes as input an identity id , hard-wired public parameters ω pos , and a candidate proof of space π, and it returns a decision bit.
We require the following properties to hold.
Completeness: For all id ∈ {0, 1} k , we have that
where the probability is taken over the randomness of algorithms Setup and P, and over the choice of the random oracle. Extractability: There exists a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm K (the knowledge extractor) such that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B, and for any id ∈ {0, 1} k , we have
where the experiment G ext B,id (λ) is dened as follows:
1. Sample ω pos ← Setup H (1 λ ) and π ← P H ωpos (id ).
Let
contains the sequence of queries of B to H and the corresponding answers, and where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of Setup, B, P, and over the choice of the random oracle.
Roughly, the extractability property requires that no space-bounded adversary is able to modify an honestly computed proof π for identity id into an accepting proofπ for an identityĩd = id . Moreover, this holds true even if A is chosen adaptively (possibly depending on the public parameters, the identity id , and a corresponding valid proof π) by a PPT algorithm B with unbounded space. Since, however, B can compute oine an arbitrary polynomial number of valid proofs (id i , π i ), what the denition requires is that no (B, A) is able to yield a valid pair (ĩ d ,π) for anĩd dierent than id that the knowledge extractor K cannot predict by just looking at B's random oracle queries. It is easy to see that such an extractability requirement constitutes a stronger form of soundness, as dened, e.g., in [4, 40] .
NIPoS Construction
We now give a NIPoS construction that is essentially a non-interactive variant of the PoS constructions of [40] that is in turn based on [4] . In particular, we show that it satises the stronger form of soundness which we call extractability. In addition, we formalize the security analysis given in [40] with concrete parameters that may be of independent interest.
The construction is built from the following ingredients:
A random oracle H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n H . A graph G µ,k G ,α,β from the family of SoLEG (cf. Section 4.3), where α, β are constants in (0, 1) such that 2α < β. By denition of such a graph, the number of nodes is given by N = µ(k G + 1). The in-degree d depends on γ = β − 2α, and it is hence constant. 19 Without loss of generality we assume that the vertices of G µ,k G ,α,β are ordered lexicographically and are represented by integers in [N ] . For simplicity we also assume that N is a power of 2, and that log(N ) divides n H . A (n H , n cm , N, n op , ν mt )-Merkle commitment scheme (MGen H , MCommit H ,
19 As recommended in [40] we will typically work with 0.7 ≤ γ ≤ 0.9 to get loosely 40 < d < 200.
Fig. 2: Our NIPoS construction.
Our construction is formally described in Fig. 2 . Let us here just briey explain the main ideas. The setup algorithm chooses a graph G µ,k G ,α,β from the family of SoLEG. Given an identity id , the prover rst computes the H idlabeling of the graph G µ,k G ,α,β and commits to the resulting string using the Merkle commitment scheme. Then τ vertices of the graph are randomly chosen. For each challenged vertex v, the prover computes and outputs the opening for this vertex as well as opening for all its predecessors. The verier gets as input the identity, a commitment, and τ (d + 1) openings, where d is the degree of the graph. It rstly veries the consistency of all the openings with respect to the commitment. Secondly, it checks the local correctness of the H id -labeling.
The completeness of our scheme relies on the correctness of the underlying commitment scheme. The extractability will follow from the pebbling complexity of the graph G µ,k G ,α,β and the binding property of the commitment scheme. In particular, we prove the following statement: Theorem 2. Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n H be a random oracle, G µ,k G ,α,β be a SoLEG with N = µ(k G + 1) nodes and d in-degree, and (MGen H , MCommit H , MOpen H , MVer H ) be a (n H , n cm , N, n op , ν mt )-Merkle commitment. Let s, t ∈ N be such that, for some δ ∈ [0, β − 2α), we have t < 2 k G αµ and s ≤ δµn H . Then, the NIPoS scheme described in Fig. 2 is a (s P , s V , s, t, k, n, ν pos )-NIPoS for any k ∈ N, as long as:
where Q H (A) are the random oracle queries asked by A and γ = β − 2α.
The formal proof appears in the full version. We provide some intuitions here. 
Then, for any δ ∈ (0, γ), the scheme described in Fig. 2 is a (s P , s V , s, t, k, n, ν pos )-NIPoS, for t ∈ poly(λ) and Recall that, in our denition of non-malleability, the parameter s represents the space available for tampering, which is split into two components: p bits of persistent space, which includes the n bits necessary for storing the codeword and which is never erased, and s − p bits of transient space that is erased after each tampering query. Also, note that the above statement shows a clear tradeo between the parameter θ (controlling the number of allowed tampering queries) and the leakage bound . Indeed, the larger θ, the more leakage we need, until the security guarantee becomes empty; this tradeo is consistent with Theorem 1 (see also Fig. 1 ), as we know that leaky space-bounded non-malleability, for non-trivial values of , is impossible for p ≈ n + k, whenever θ ≥ k.
Proof of Security
The correctness of the coding scheme is guaranteed by the perfect completeness of the NIPoS. Moreover, since the decoding algorithm simply runs the verier of the NIPoS, it is straightforward to observe that decoding is s V bounded.
Auxiliary algorithms. We start by introducing two auxiliary algorithms that will be useful in the proof. Recall that, by extractability of the NIPoS, there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm K such that, given the public parameters ω pos and a table of RO queries Q H , returns a set of identities {id i } i∈[q] , for some q ∈ poly(λ). We dene the following algorithms that use K as a subroutine.
Algorithm Find(ω pos , id , Q H ): Given a value id ∈ {0, 1} kpos , it rst runs K to obtain {id i } i∈[q] := K(ω pos , Q H ). If there exists an index i ∈ [q] such that id = id i , then it returns the string str := bit(i)||01, 20 where the function bit(·) returns the binary representation of its input. Otherwise, the algorithm returns the ag 1 . Clearly, = log(q) + 2.
Algorithm Reconstruct(ω pos , str, Q H ): On receiving an -bit string str and a RO query table Q H , it works as follows depending on the value of str:
If str = 0 , output the symbol same . If str = 1 , output the symbol ⊥. If str = a||01, set i := bit −1 (a). Hence, run algorithm K to get the set
Constructing the simulator. We now describe the simulator S D = (S D 1 , S D 2 ), depending on a PPT distinguisher D. 21 A formal description of the simulator is given in Fig. 3 ; we provide some intuitions below.
Informally, algorithm S 1 simulates the random oracle H by sampling a random key χ ← {0, 1} n key for a pseudorandom function (PRF) PRF χ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n H ; hence, it denes H(u) := PRF χ (u) for any u ∈ {0, 1} * . 22 S 2 receives the description of the RO (i.e., the PRF key χ) from S 1 , and for each tampering query A i from D it asks a leakage query L i to its leakage oracle. The leakage query hard-codes the description of the simulated RO, the table Q H (D) consisting of all RO queries asked by D (until this point), and the code of all tampering algorithms A 1 , · · · , A i . Thus, L i rst encodes the target message x to generate a codeword c, applies the composed function A i •A i−1 •· · ·•A 1 on c to generate the tampered codewordc i , and decodesc i obtaining a valuex i . Finally, the leakage function signals whetherx i is equal to the original message x, to ⊥, or to some of the identities the extractor K would output given the list of D's RO queries (as dened in algorithm Find). Upon receiving the output from the leakage oracle, S 2 runs Reconstruct and outputs whatever this algorithm returns. Some intuitions. Firstly, note that in the real experiment the random oracle is a truly random function, whereas in the simulation random oracle queries are 20 Looking ahead, in the simulation we use the strings 0 and 1 as ags; therefore, appending 01 to str ensures that str is never misinterpreted as those ags. 21 In the rest of the proof we drop the superscript D, and just let S = (S1, S2). Simulator S = (S1, S2) 1. Let PRFχ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n H be a PRF. The simulator S1 samples a uniform random key χ ← {0, 1} n key and denes H := PRFχ. The query table QH(D) that stores RO queries from D is initially empty. 2. For i ∈ [θ] the simulator does the following:
(a) S1 simulates the random oracle queries made by D, before Ai is chosen, and updates the table QH(D) accordingly. (b) On receiving the adversary Ai, the simulator S2 queries its leakage oracle O ,x leak with L : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} (where = O(log(λ))) described as follows:
Description of L:
L is hard-coded with the description of H (i.e., with PRFχ), the table QH(D), the code of (A1, A2, . . . , Ai), and the code of the knowledge extractor K of the NIPoS.
Produce the codeword c ← Encode H ω (x) and initialize the auxiliary space σ := 0 s−n .
Let Ai := Ai • Ai−1 • · · · • A1. Run Ai to get (c,σ) := Ai(c; σ). Computex := Decode H ω (c). Ifx = ⊥, output the ag 1 , else, if x = x, output the ag 0 ; otherwise run strx := Find(ω,x, QH(D)) and output strx.
All other oracle queries that are not asked by D (e.g., queries made by Aj, or while running Encode etc.) are simulated internally. (c) On receiving an -bit string str from L, simulator S2 runsx ← Reconstruct(ω, strx, QH(D)) and outputsx. Fig. 3 : Description of the simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) answered using a PRF. However, using the security of the PRF, we can move to a mental experiment that is exactly the same as the simulated game, but replaces the PRF with a truly random function.
Secondly, a closer look at the algorithms Find and Reconstruct reveals that the only case in which the simulation strategy goes wrong is when the tampered codewordc i is valid, but the leakage corresponding to the output of Find provokes a ⊥ by Reconstruct for some i ∈ [θ]. We denote this event as Fail. We prove that Fail occurs exactly when the adversary D violates the extractibility property of the underlying NIPoS, which happens only with negligible probability.
To simplify the notation in the proof, let us write to denote the interaction in the real, resp. mental, resp. simulated experiment.
Formal analysis. Consider an adversary D which makes θ queries to O cnm . By Denition 7, we need to prove that the simulator S D = (S D 1 , S D 2 ) dened in Fig. 3 is such that, for all values x ∈ {0, 1} k , there is a negligible function ν : N → [0, 1] satisfying Pr D cnm (ω) = 1 : ω ← Init H (1 λ ) − Pr D sim (ω) = 1 : ω ← Init S1 (1 λ ) ≤ ν(λ). Proof. By inspection of the simulator's description it follows that, conditioning on event Fail not happening, the simulation oracle using S 2 yields a view that is identical to the one obtained when interacting with the tampering oracle. The claim follows.
Combining the above two claims together with Eq. (1), we obtain that
is negligible, as desired.
It remains to argue about the size of leakage. To this end, it suces to note that the simulator S 2 receives O(log(λ)) bits of leakage for every i ∈ [θ]. Thus, the total amount of leakage is θ · O(log(λ)), exactly as stated in the theorem.
Concrete Instantiation and Parameters
Instantiating Theorem 3 with our concrete NIPoS from Corollary 1, and using bounds from Theorem 1, we obtain the following corollaries. The rst corollary provides an upper bound on the number of tolerated tampering queries at the price of a high (but still non-trivial) leakage parameter. Corollary 2. For any γ, δ, ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists an explicit construction of a (k, n)-code in the ROM that is a (γ · k, s, p, θ, Θ(λ 4 ))-SP-NMC, where k = Θ(λ 4 ) n = Θ(λ 4 ) Θ(λ 4 ) ≤ p ≤ s = δλ 5 θ = Θ(λ 4−ε ).
The second corollary yields a smaller number of tolerated tampering queries with optimal (logarithmic) leakage parameter. Trading Leakage for Tamper-Proof Security
We revise the standard application of non-malleable codes to obtain protection against memory tampering attacks. The main idea, put forward in [21] , is very simple. Let F be an arbitrary functionality, initialized with secret key κ; instead of storing κ, we store an encoding c of κ, computed via a non-malleable code.
Hence, whenever we have to run F, we decode c obtaining a valueκ which we use to evaluate the functionality on any chosen input. It is not too hard to show that this idea yields security against tampering attacks against the secret key, for the same class of adversaries supported by the non-malleable code.
This methodology, also known as tamper simulatability, has been explored in several variants [35, 25, 13, 26] . Here, we propose yet another variant where the above compiler is instantiated using a leaky space-bounded continuously nonmalleable code; this yields security in a model where it is possible to trade security against space-bounded memory tampering, with some bits of leakage on the secret key, an idea already explored in a related line of research [28] .
Leaky Tamper Simulatability
Let F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} k in → {0, 1} kout be a randomized functionality, taking as input a secret value κ ∈ {0, 1} k and a string m ∈ {0, 1} k in , and producing a value y ← F(κ, m) ∈ {0, 1} kout . For simplicity, we consider the case of stateless functionalities where the value κ is never updated during the computation;
an extension to the case of stateful functionalities is immediate, along the lines of previous work [21, 35, 25] . We note, however, that since updating the value κ requires execution of the encoding algorithm (which uses a lot of space), considering only stateless functionalities is natural in our model.
Given a non-malleable code Π, the hardened functionality corresponding to F is dened below. For consistency with the rest of the paper, we state the denition in the ROM. Denition 10 (Hardened functionality).Considera functionality F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} k in → {0, 1} kout , and let Π = (Init H , Encode H , Decode H ) be a (k, n)-code in the ROM. For parameters s, p ∈ N, with s ≥ p ≥ n, the (s, p)-memory hardened functionalityF(Π, s, p) corresponding to F consists of algorithms (Setup H , Run H ) with the following syntax. It follows by correctness of the encoding scheme that, for all inputs,F (Π, s, p) computes exactly the same functionality as F. Notice that the hardened functionality corresponding to F has p bits of persistent storage (i.e., n bits for storing the secret encoding and p − n bits for auxiliary data); the remaining s − p bits represent transient storage that is needed for decoding the codeword and running the original functionality with the obtained key (this memory is erased after each evaluation).
In case there is not enough transient space to decode or to run the original functionality, an external memory must be used. Thus, we get a natural trade-o between the amount of auxiliary data that can be stored on the device and the class of functionalities that can be executed without using an external memory.
Tampering experiment. To dene security, we consider an s-bounded adversary that tampers with the memory content of the hardened functionality. This is done via the experiment described below, which is executed by a PPT algorithm D, and is parametrized by an (s, p)-memory hardened functionalityF (Π, s, p), a key κ ∈ {0, 1} k , a parameter θ ∈ N, and security parameter λ ∈ N. 
Analysis
In the following theorem, the proof of which appears in the full version, we show the correspondence between leaky non-malleable and leaky tamper simulatable codes.
Theorem 4. Let Π be an -leaky (s, p)-space-bounded θ-continuously non-malleable code in the ROM. Then, Π is also -leaky (s, p)-space θ-tamper simulatable in the ROM.
Informally, Theorem 4 states that every functionality F that is resistant to bits of leakage on the secret key can be protected against memory tampering by an -leaky non-malleable code.
